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# Complexity is the Enemy of Security Take it Out

#### Steve Winterfeld

Advisory CISO Akamai

Akamai

Experience the Edge


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"><div>Password<br/>
"><div>Class="button\_area aclb apl"> <input type="hidden" name="p" value="XX




#### **RS∧**Conference 2023

San Francisco | April 24 – 27 | Moscone Center

# RSA 2023

599 Speakers 605 Vendors

#76?




#### **Goals for Transformation**


- Faster
- Better
- Cheaper
- Secure




# **Triple Extortion Threat Immediate Impacts**




# **Environment components**





## Future of Network Security Is in the Cloud



#### Benefits:

- Reduce complexity
- Simplify vendor management

# Zero Trust Edge

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## MITRE ATT&CK

Reconnaissance 10 techniques	Resource Development 7 techniques	Initial Access 9 techniques	Execution 13 techniques	Persistence 19 techniques	Privilege Escalation 13 techniques	<b>Defense Evasion</b> 42 techniques	Credential Access 17 techniques	<b>Discovery</b> 30 techniques	Lateral Movement 9 techniques	Collection 17 techniques	Command and Control 16 techniques	Exfiltration 9 techniques	Impact 13 techniques
Active Scanning (0/3)	Acquire Infrastructure (0/7)	Drive-by Compromise	Command and Scripting Interpreter (3/8)	Account Manipulation (0/5)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism (0/4)	Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism <sub>(0/4)</sub>	Adversary-in- the-Middle (0/3)	Account Discovery (0/4)  Application Window	Exploitation of Remote Services	Adversary-in- the-Middle <sub>(0/3)</sub>	Application Layer Protocol (0/4)	Automated Exfiltration (0/1)	Account Access Removal
Information (0/4) Gather Victim Identity Information (0/3)	Compromise Accounts (0/3)	Exploit Public- Facing Application	Container Administration Command	BITS Jobs  Boot or Logon Autostart	Access Token Manipulation (0/5)	Access Token Manipulation (0/5) BITS Jobs	Brute Force (0/4)  Credentials from Password	Discovery  Browser Bookmark Discovery	Internal Spearphishing	Archive Collected Data <sub>(0/3)</sub> Audio Capture	Communication Through Removable Media	Data Transfer Size Limits Exfiltration Over	Data Destruction  Data Encrypted for Impact
Gather Victim Network Information (0/6)	Infrastructure (0/7)	External Remote Services	Deploy Container	Execution (0/14) Boot or Logon	Boot or Logon Autostart Execution (0/14)	Build Image on Host	Stores (0/5) Exploitation for	Cloud Infrastructure Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Automated Collection	Data Encoding (0/2)	Alternative Protocol (0/3)	Data Manipulation (0/3)
Gather Victim Org Information (0/4)	Capabilities (0/4) Establish Accounts (0/3)	Hardware Additions  Phishing (1/3)	Exploitation for Client Execution	Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts (0/5)	Debugger Evasion  Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	Credential Access Forced	Cloud Service Dashboard	Remote Service Session Hijacking <sub>(0/2)</sub>	Browser Session Hijacking	Data Obfuscation (0/3)	Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Exfiltration Over	Defacement (0/2)  Disk Wipe (0/2)
Phishing for Information (0/3)	Obtain Capabilities (2/6)	Replication Through	Communication (0/3)  Native API	Extensions  Compromise	Create or Modify System	Deploy Container	Authentication Forge Web	Cloud Service Discovery Cloud Storage Object	Remote Services (1/6)	Clipboard Data  Data from Cloud	Dynamic Resolution (0/3)	Other Network Medium (0/1)	Endpoint Denial of Service
Search Closed Sources (0/2)	Stage Capabilities (0/6)	Removable Media Supply Chain Compromise (0/3)	Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)	Client Software Binary Create	Process (0/4)  Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Direct Volume Access  Domain Policy Modification (0/2)	Credentials (0/2) Input Capture (0/4)	Discovery  Container and Resource Discovery	Replication Through Removable Media	Storage  Data from Configuration	Encrypted Channel (0/2)	Exfiltration Over Physical Medium (0/1)	Firmware Corruption
Databases (0/5)		Trusted Relationship	Serverless Execution Shared Modules	Account (0/3)  Create or Modify	Escape to Host	Execution Guardrails (0/1)	Modify Authentication	Debugger Evasion	Software Deployment	Repository (0/2)  Data from	Channels Ingress Tool	Exfiltration Over Web Service (1/2)	II Recovery
Websites/Domains (0/3) Search Victim-Owned Websites		Valid Accounts (0/4)	Software Deployment Tools	System Process (0/4) Event Triggered	Event Triggered Execution (0/16)	Exploitation for Defense Evasion	Process (0/7)  Multi-Factor Authentication	Domain Trust Discovery  File and Directory Discovery	Tools Taint Shared Content	Information Repositories (0/3)	Multi-Stage Channels	Scheduled Transfer	Network Denial of Service (0/2) Resource Hijacking
			System Services (0/2) User Execution (1/3)	Execution (0/16)  External Remote Services	Privilege Escalation Hijack Execution	File and Directory Permissions Modification (0/2)	Interception  Multi-Factor Authentication	Group Policy Discovery Network Service	Use Alternate Authentication Material	System  Data from Network Shared	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Transfer Data to Cloud Account	Service Stop System
			Windows Management Instrumentation	Hijack Execution Flow (0/12)	Flow (0/12) Process	Hide Artifacts (0/10) Hijack Execution	Request Generation	Discovery  Network Share	(0/4)	Drive Data from	Non-Standard Port		Shutdown/Reboot
				Implant Internal Image	Injection (1/12) Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)	Flow (0/12) Impair Defenses (0/9)	Network Sniffing OS Credential	Network Sniffing		Removable Media Data Staged (1/2)	Protocol Tunneling Proxy (0/4)		
				Modify Authentication Process (0/7)	Valid Accounts (0/4)	Indicator Removal (0/9)	Dumping (0/8) Steal	Password Policy Discovery		Email Collection (0/3)	Remote Access Software	•	
				Office Application Startup (0/6)		Execution  Masquerading (0/7)	Application Access Token Steal or Forge	Peripheral Device Discovery Permission Groups		Input Capture <sub>(0/4)</sub>	Traffic Signaling (0/2)		
				Pre-OS Boot (0/5)  Scheduled Task/Job (0/5)		Modify Authentication Process (0/7) Modify Cloud Compute	Authentication Certificates Steal or Forge	Discovery (2/3) Process Discovery	"	Screen Capture Video Capture	Web Service (0/3)	1	
				Server Software Component (0/5)		Infrastructure (0/4) Modify Registry	Kerberos Tickets (0/4)	Query Registry  Remote System					
				Traffic Signaling <sub>(0/2)</sub>		Modify System Image <sub>(0/2)</sub>	Steal Web Session Cookie Unsecured	Discovery  Software Discovery (0/1)	П				
				Valid Accounts (0/4)		Network Boundary Bridging <sub>(0/1)</sub>	Credentials (0/7)	System Information Discovery					
4						Obfuscated Files or		System Location			,		legend


### What are the risks and impacts

- Operational
- Brand / Trust
- Compliance
- Revenue

# Focus on material impacts


Reduce the probability of material impact due to a cyber event over the next three years

From: Cyber First Principles



## The journey

- Framework vs Guiding Principle
- Culture (in house vs managed)
- Reduce tools + tech dept > automate
- Compliance (byproduct)



KISS (keep it simple stupid)

#### **Next steps**

- Consolidate tools
- Optimize current capabilities
- Solve with current partners
- Buy tools that play well with others

Tech / Process / People



Akamai Threat Hub:

www.akamai.com/our-thinking/threat-research



```
count, err := strconv.ParseInt(r.FormValue("count"), 10, 64); if e
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        Channel <- reqChan; timeout := time. After(time. Second); select {
OVE To the control of the proof of the proof
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            seWriter, r *http.Request) { hostTokens := strings.Split(r.Host, ":"); |
```

"net/http"; "strconv"; "strings"; "time" ); type ControlMessage http.HandleFunc("/status",func(w http.Responsewiller, "

= true; go doStuff(msg, workerCompleteChan); case status := <

r \*http.Request) { hostTokens := strings.Split(r.Host, ":");

err.Error()); return; }; msg := ControlMessage{Target: r.FormValue("talget: projection "ACTIVE") fmt.Fprint(w, "ACTIVE"); } else { fmt.Fprint(w, "INACTIVE"); }; retul (chan chan bool); workerActive := false; go admin(controlChannel, state)

http.ResponseWriter, r \*http.Request) { reqChan := make(chanbool); statu type ControlMessage struct { Target string; Count int64; }; func main() status := <- workerCompleteChan: workerActive = status; }}; func admir</pre> count); cc <- msg; fmt.Fprintf(w, "Control message issued for Target %s timeout: fmt.Fprint(w, "TIMEOUT");}}); log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":1337

#### func(w http.ResponseWriter, r \*http.Request) { reqChan := make(chanbool); state life online type ControlMessage struct { Target string; Count int64; }; func main() tatus := <- workerCompleteChan: workerActive = status; }}}; func admir ount: count}; cc <- msg; fmt.Fprintf(w, "Control message issued for Target % - timeout: fmt.Fprint(w, "TIMEOUT");}}); log.Fatal(http.ListenAndServe(":1337 isPollChannel); for { select { case respChan := <- statusPollChannel: respChan</pre>

#### **Notes**

- Mindset What is next step
- Exercise
- Why does is happen entropy
- Use case M&A
- Models hide complexity